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Does Restructuring Pay in Japan? 
 
Evidence Following the Lost Decade 
 
Abstract 
After  over  a  decade  of  sluggish  economic  growth  accompanied  by  massive  fiscal  stimulus  and 
government handouts (not unlike the response to the current global crisis) in the 1990s, it remains an 
open question whether and how Japanese firms have restructured their operations, and whether these 
efforts have borne any fruit.  The popular consensus is that Japanese companies did start to implement 
tough restructuring measures at the start of the 21
st century, but there is little evidence describing the 
scope and ultimate efficacy of such measures. Using a randomly selected sample of 300 firms from the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, we collect all restructuring announcement made in the aftermath of the so-
called lost decade, specifically in the 2000-2001 period.  Our results are striking in that while we find 
that firms engaging in restructuring of various sorts display improved earnings in the period following 
the restructuring announcement, shareholders do not appear to benefit at the time of the restructuring 
announcements.  Our results are consistent with a model of corporate governance whereby the benefits 
of restructuring accrue to fixed as opposed to residual claimants, sometimes referred to as a creditor-
centric corporate governance system.   I.    Introduction  
In this paper we find widespread evidence of restructuring among a randomly selected 
group of 300 Japanese firms during our sample period of 2000-2001, a period of significant 
prudential and accounting policy change.  We choose this period because it follows the slow 
growth ‘lost decade’ of the 1990’s in Japan, a period of major financial sector crisis resulting 
from failures in prudential policy (much like the current American financial crisis), which 
gave rise to strong incentives for Japanese firms to undertake restructuring measures. We find 
significant  improvements  in  firm  performance  using  accounting  measures  of  profitability 
following restructuring announcements.  While we do not find any significant stock returns 
surrounding  restructuring  announcements,  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CAR’s)  at  lower 
frequencies  show  statistically  significant,  albeit  economically  small,  improvements.    Our 
results are consistent with a model of corporate governance where the primary beneficiary of 
restructuring  announcements  are  fixed  claimants,  such  as  creditors,  and  where  residual 
claimants remain skeptical whether they will materially benefit from such restructuring efforts.    
Distinctive contributions of this study include our choice of sample period at the heels 
of a decade long economic slump in Japan, and an explicit recognition of the sample selection 
bias  associated  with  focusing  on  firms  that  choose  to  announce  restructuring  measures.  
Indeed, an issue with empirical studies on corporate restructuring has been the tendency to 
draw  causal  inferences  from  a  sample  of  firms  that  chose  to  make  restructuring 
announcements.   Second, while not the main focus of this paper, we believe that our study 
offers useful insights into potential pitfalls of the present U.S. administration approach to 
addressing  the  current  financial  crisis.    Specifically,  after  a  decade  of  financial  window 
dressing  and  Keynesian-style  economic  stimulus  in  Japan,  meaningful  restructuring 
announcements from firms essentially came only after the Japanese government eased off on Page 2 
 
showering  firms  with  bailouts  and  push  them  toward  greater  transparency  (Patterson  and 
Beason,  2001).    Our  study  suggests  that  government  infatuation  with  macroeconomic 
stimulus measures may actually deter and delay meaningful changes at the firm level.   
Corporate restructurings have been studied extensively in other locales.  The literature 
on  corporate  performance  and  restructurings  in  the  U.S.  deals  with  capital  expansions 
(McConnell  and  Muscarella  1985),  asset  disposal  (John  and  Ofek,  1995),  internal 
reorganization (Brickley and Van Drunen, 1990), plant closings (Blackwell, et al, 1990), and 
layoffs (Chen et al, 2001).  Kang and Shivdasani (1997) consider restructuring and corporate 
performance in Japan during the bubble period of 1986-1989.  The results of this literature are 
mixed.    Sometimes  restructuring  measures  appear  to  enhance  shareholder  returns  or 
performance, and sometimes they do not.  If one wanted to make a broad generalization about 
state  of  the  literature,  however,  it  would  be  to  suggest  that  restructuring  announcements 
generally produce small but significant increases in returns, at least in the US market.  On the 
other hand, some types of announcements, such as layoffs, seem to generate negative returns.  
This is likely due to the mixed information contained in the announcement, noise, test power 
and issues of timing.   
We  believe  ours  is  the  first  study  to  examine  the  behavior  of  firms  following  a 
prolonged period of sluggish growth in a country not known for corporate restructuring.  As 
opposed to affecting a few firms (as in the Kang and Shivdasani, 1997, sample) this decade 
long slowdown in the 1990s affected, to varying degrees, all firms in Japan.  This gives us a 
natural benchmark for comparison purposes – roughly 30% of our sample of 300 randomly-
selected firms made some sort of restructuring announcement during 2000-2001.  The non-
announcing firms provide a natural benchmark against which to judge the efficacy of these 
restructuring efforts.   Page 3 
 
We categorize restructuring announcements into six broad categories.  These include 
contraction-type  actions  (such  as  divestitures  and  consolidations),  employment  changes 
(including workforce reductions), expansion-type actions (e.g., setting up production facilities 
in  lower-cost  countries),  internal  reorganizations  (such  as  streamlining  production  costs), 
changes in internal control (e.g.  CEO turnovers) and financial restructurings.  Contraction-
type actions, employment changes and internal reorganizations involve retrenchments, and 
represent  approximately  two-thirds  of  all  restructuring  announcements.    Financial 
restructurings and changes in internal control are relatively rarer events, representing 6% of 
all announcements.   
Our  main  results  are  that  firms  announcing  restructuring  programs  experience  an 
improvement  in  operating  earnings  in  the  following  year  (as  well  as  in  the  second  year 
following  the  announcement).    More  specifically,  retrenchment  actions  are  followed  by 
improvements  in  operating  performance,  while  expansion  actions  are  not.    Financial 
restructurings also result in performance improvements.  These results are robust to outliers 
and industry adjustments.  When we control for other firm characteristics, as well as for the 
performance  change  for  non-announcing  firms,  the  results  for  employment  changes  and 
internal  reorganizations  remain  significant,  although  the  performance  improvement  for 
contraction-type reorganizations are no longer significant.   
We recognize that firms in our sample are not randomly assigned to the announcing 
and non-announcing groups, and therefore the performance improvements associated with the 
former may well be endogenous to the decision to embark on such restructuring programs.  
We use a two-stage least squares (2-SLS) model to address this issue.  We first model the 
decision to announce as a function of foreign ownership under the assumption that foreigners 
(mostly U.S.  institutions) have generally been more active in pressuring management than 
their Japanese counterparts.  We then use the predicted value of the announcing probabilities Page 4 
 
as a regressor in the second stage performance regressions.  Our main results are robust to this 
endogeneity correction.  We note that prior studies on performance surrounding restructuring 
announcements have not controlled for such endogeneity, leaving open the question of proper 
identification of the second stage structural equation.   
We  repeat  the  tests  for  operating  performance  using  announcement  period  stock 
returns  to  examine  whether  market  participants  are  able  to  anticipate  the  gains  from 
restructuring announcements for our sample of firms.  Overall, these results are not significant.  
It appears that shareholders in Japan are skeptical of the restructuring moves announced by 
firms, perhaps on account of a decade long wait during which firms did little to address the 
sluggish growth environment they faced.  An alternative possibility is that the performance 
improvements  we  document  were  indeed  perceived  as  real  and  anticipated  as  such,  but 
shareholders remained doubtful if these gains would ever flow through to them as residual 
claimants.     
In the next section we describe in more detail the events of the 1990s that provide the 
backdrop  for  the  spate  of  restructuring  announcements  in  2000-2001.    In  section  III,  we 
describe the sample selection process and our data sources.  In section IV and section V, we 
present the results on operating performance and stock returns.  Section VI concludes this 
paper.   
II.    Background on the 1990s – the “Lost Decade” in Japan 
The 1990s represent a unique period in post-war Japan.  For the first time in post-war 
history, Japanese managers experienced a prolonged period of slow to negative growth, and, 
unlike their Western counterparts, had little experience in dealing with such contractions, 
especially after participating in the fast-paced growth of the 1980s.  The asset pricing bubble Page 5 
 
of the late 1980s resulted in further dislocations in the 1990s, especially the non-performing 
loan banking crisis (with striking parallels to the global banking crises of the last two years), 
and was followed by dramatically slower economic growth for the remainder of the decade.  
Japanese firms were slow to respond to the crisis, waiting for improved economic growth and 
government assistance rather than undertaking much needed restructuring.   
By the mid-1990’s, however, it became clear that ‘growing out of the crisis’ was no 
longer an option, and an increasing number of firms did begin to restructure, and a number of 
very large firms went bankrupt.  During the decade after the stock market crash the Japanese 
economy and firms underwent significant transition.  Foreign ownership  quadrupled from 
under 5% in 1990 to the end of our sample period in 2002 (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2006).  
Finally from the mid 1990’s and into the first years of this century a number of restructuring 
friendly measures were passed into law, and genuine restructuring on a broad scale finally 
began.    Since  such  changes  form  the  basis  of  the  motivation  for  this  study,  it  is  worth 
considering them in some detail.
1 
Between 1993 and 1997 a number of major financial institutions experienced financial 
difficulty, and the Ministry of Finance essentially admitted that it had been allowing financial 
institutions to avoid reporting losses on real estate investments on the assumption that the real 
estate  market  would  recover.    The  lack  of  transparency  and  uncertainty  regarding  the 
magnitude of the financial crisis resulted in the ‘Japan premium’
2 reaching almost 1% in 1997 
(see Peek and Rosengren, 2000).   
By 1997 a number of prudential and accounting reforms were initiated that would help 
promote  corporate  restructuring  (or  at  least  make  monitoring  of  restructuring  efforts  by 
                                                 
1 See, for example ‘New Japan Part I,’ Warburg Dillon Read (Now UBS), 4 January 2000 for an extensive list of 
restructuring announcements and accounting/prudential policy changes. 
2 The term ‘Japan Premium’ as used in the business press typically referred to the premium on offshore interbank 
overnight borrowing by Japanese banks of a certain risk class relative to foreign banks of a similar risk class.   Page 6 
 
shareholders  simpler),  improve  the  stability  of  the  banking  system  through  improved 
prudential  policy,  and  ultimately  allow  for  improvements  in  corporate  performance.  
Significant  changes  in  bank  prudential  policy  began  in  1995,  spearheaded  by  the  newly 
created Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA).  In 1997 the government formally recognized 
that Japan’s bank centered financial system gave dominance to creditors over shareholders in 
terms of monitoring, and that the Ministry of Finance’s (MOF) implicit guarantees that large 
institutions would not fail exacerbated the moral hazard inherent in such a system.  These 
implicit guarantees were formally ended in 1997, and major accounting and prudential policy 
changes were initiated.  New accounting standards were announced between 1997 and 2000 
to bring Japanese practices in line with international norms, with full implementation by 2000.  
The major changes in the accounting standards relate to rules and reporting with respect to 
consolidation, fair value definitions and accounting for pension liabilities and expense.   
Taken together, the accounting reforms initially caused the measured performance of 
parent firms to decline, putting pressure on many of the largest companies to restructure.  
Specifically,  by  2000  the  combined  impact  of  the  accounting  changes  was  to  cause  an 
increase in shareholder equity (especially the accounting of cross shareholdings), leading to a 
decline in (already pitiful) measures such as return on equity and return on assets (ROA).  At 
the same time, holdings by foreign institutional investors had been steadily rising throughout 
the 1990’s, and these investors, unlike domestic institutions, were particularly concerned with 
performance measures.  Japanese companies that had been accustomed to just giving foreign 
investors a tour of the factory floor became increasingly concerned with ways to increase 
performance measures.   
At the same time that prudential policy and accounting standards were upgraded, other 
‘shareholder friendly’ measures were introduced.  Share buybacks were allowed since 1996, 
and steadily increased since then to our sample period.  Corporate income taxes were steadily Page 7 
 
slashed during the period up to 2000, by which time they had fallen from among the highest 
in the world to equivalent to those paid by firms in California.  The decades old ban on 
holding companies, introduced by General MacArthur, was finally repealed in 1997.  While 
this at first sight might appear benign or negative, it is actually an important ingredient in 
Japanese restructuring.  For the non-financial sector it provides a vehicle for parent firms to 
hold subsidiaries and affiliates in a more arms-length relationship, adding them or shedding 
them  as  the  need  arises,  rather  than  the  messy  and  difficult  to  sever  cross  shareholding 
mechanism.  For financial firms, it allowed for the necessary mechanism to enable mergers, 
and also for parent firms to enter other business lines without necessarily straying from their 
core competency.   
While conventional wisdom maintains that Japanese firms are seriously constrained 
from undertaking significant restructuring due to rigid labor practices, such as the difficulty of 
large firms to layoff or fire workers (except in cases of financial exigency), some progress has 
been made in that area.  The easiest way for large firms to shed labor is to rely more heavily 
on ‘part time’ employees, whose hours can be reduced or eliminated easily.  ‘Part time’ in 
large  Japanese  firms  is  often  very  close  to  full  time,  the  major  distinction  simply  being 
classified as such (Beason, 1992). 
It is against this background that we have chosen the period spanning 2000 and 2001 
for our observations.     
III.    Sample and Restructuring Announcement Characteristics 
We randomly selected 300 TSE1 firms from a current total of 1743 TSE1 firms.  We 
exclude  consideration  of  firms  in  the  financial  sector  due  to  the  incomparability  of 
performance data for such firms relative to the rest of the sample.  There are other reasons for Page 8 
 
excluding financial sector firms, including the fact that restructuring measures in that sector 
are often quite different from other sectors, and have often included radical transformations 
including de-listing of the original entity.  Firms from all other industry groupings in the TSE 
are represented.  For our sample period of 2000-2001, some of the selected firms had to be 
eliminated either because they were newly listed during or after our sample period, or were 
not traded for significant periods.  After such eliminations, 289 firms remained from our 
original sample of 300.  Among these firms, 90 made restructuring announcements during the 
sample period for a total of 836 such announcements.    
Restructuring announcements were found by searching for all newspaper articles and 
announcements  for the sample of 300 firms  in  the  Nihon  Keizai Shinbum, Japan’s  major 
business and financial daily.  This was accomplished by using the ‘C-brain’ online search and 
research  service  from  the  same  source.    We  then  grouped  these  into  45  restructuring 
announcement types within 6 major categories.  We have used all announcements during the 
period, rather than selecting only certain types of announcements as is typically the case in 
this literature. 
While we included every type of restructuring announcement made by our sample of 
firms during FY2000-2001, we have categorized them in a fashion that makes comparison 
with previous studies possible.  In particular, we were able to group announcement types into 
categories that are comparable to those of Kang and Shivdasani (1997), a study that examined 
restructuring during the bubble period of the late 1980s.  While comparison of our results with 
those of Kang and Shivdasani is interesting, it should be noted that their 1980s bubble period 
is very different from our sample period for a number of important reasons.  As noted earlier, 
accounting standards and transparency were radically different, and economic conditions were 
much stronger with fewer firms subject to financial fragility.  Furthermore, Japan in the late Page 9 
 
1980’s was at the zenith of its bank centered financial system, and restructurings were largely 
undertaken at the behest of creditors, rather than being management driven.
3   
The full list of announcement types and frequencies studied is presented in  Table 1.  
We consider six major categories of announcement types: contraction actions, employment 
changes, expansion actions, internal reorganization actions, changes in internal control and 
financial restructuring.  We further consider breakdowns within each of these categories for a 
total of 45 detailed restructuring action announcement types.  Our list of categories is among 
the most comprehensive in the literature.   
Among  the  six  major  types  of  restructuring  announcements,  contraction  measures, 
employment  changes and internal  organization measures  can  generally  be viewed as  cost 
reduction or cost control measures.  Internal control and financial restructurings are typically 
governance related changes, though they may have cost and other performance implications 
as well.  Expansion measures include foreign expansions that may result in production cost 
reduction, and also includes expansion of marketing networks that may result in increased 
sales  revenue  or  improved  sales  turnover.    Generally,  other  studies  have  found  that 
restructuring announcements yield small positive response in returns, though with limited or 
no response in firm performance after such announcements (Brickley and Van Drunen, 1990).  
The exception to this finding seems to be in the case of layoffs in the U.S., where Chen, et al 
(2001) find a negative impact of such announcements on returns, presumably due to signaling 
issues discussed earlier. 
                                                 
3 For example, after the first oil shock in the mid-1970’s, Mazda’s main bank (Sumitomo Bank) carried out a 
full-scale restructuring of the firm, including replacement of top management.  In the mid-1990’s, after the main 
bank system began to crumble and the large Japanese banks found themselves in trouble, other shareholding 
groups began to flex their muscle.  In the Mazda case, Ford Motor Co.  became the de-facto monitor of the 
company and initiated radical restructuring.  More generally, see Aoki, Patrick and Sheard (1994).   Page 10 
 
IV.    Restructuring Announcements and Operating Performance 
Naturally, we would like to test whether the observed list of announcements from our 
sample of firms has had a positive impact on firm performance and returns.  A casual reading 
of  the  business  press  would  suggest  that  market  participants  in  Japan  during  our  sample 
period were highly skeptical and weary.
4  For most of the first decade following the collapse 
of the bubble economy in Japan , Japanese firms were very leery of making restructuring 
announcements.   Stakeholder rights rather than shareholder rights were paramount, and 
managers of large firms were protected from takeover by cross-shareholdings.  Restructuring 
was associated with layoffs and considered ‘un-Japanese.’  Case law in Japan effectively 
prevented layoffs in large firms except in the case of financial exigency.
5  Government, for its 
part, tried to convince the populace and market participants that economic recovery was on its 
way.  Given this history, one can understand that there might have been skepticism on the part 
of shareholders as to whether restructuring announcements would actually pay off in terms of 
firm performance.  We can model the tests of these hypotheses a  number of ways.  We are 
concerned with the potential impact of restructuring announcements on firm performance and 
returns, so we must define two basic ‘models’ of such impacts and define our performance 
measures.   
Our first measure of performance is ROA, defined as operating income scaled by book 
assets.  ROA captures two key component ratios of performance, sales turnover and margin, 
                                                 
4 See, for e.g., ‘Corporate Japan’s Stealth Makeover,’ Businessweek, September 29 2003; and  ‘Barbarians at the 
gate, vultures overhead,’ Asia Times Online, September 23 2003. 
 
5 Contrary to popular belief, layoffs and dismissals are not illegal in Japan, but a long history of case law, 
together with specificity of human capital, has made them costly.  Generally speaking, firms with more than 10 
employees are expected to avoid layoffs through reduction of hours for non-tenured employees (Beason, 1992).  
This has been reaffirmed in several court rulings, including the Shuhoku Bus Case (1968), the Toyo Sanso Co.  
Case (1979) and the SAS case (1995). Page 11 
 
as shown in the decomposition below (where EBIT refers to Earnings Before Interest and 





ROA                   (1) 
ROA is not influenced by extraordinary items and financing charges, and represents 
asset  efficiency  and  profitability.   Since  we  are  concerned  with  how restructuring  affects 
performance, and we focus on the change in ROA over a one (as well as two) year horizon 
after the restructuring announcement (vis-à-vis a year before the announcement).   
Specifically, we estimate the following equation where the R terms represent the six 
restructuring announcement categories, and the I terms correspond to two-digit industry codes.  
The C terms represent  control variables such as foreign ownership.  On the basis of this 











          (2) 
In (2), ΔROA is measured as the one or two year change in ROA.  The one (two) year 
change is the change in ROA from one (two) year before the announcement until one year 
after.  The announcements will be considered on the basis of the individual announcement 
types and a single variable capturing all announcements.  Industry dummies are the seven 
non-financial four-digit ticker codes in the TSE1.  The model for performance is essentially 
an event-type analysis on whether the defined performance variable for the announcing firms 
responds to an announcement of restructuring in period 0.  The null hypothesis for equation 
(2) is that the coefficients on announcements are individually equal to zero (we can remain 
agnostic with respect to the sum of coefficients). Page 12 
 
Of course, it may take the firm many periods to respond positively or negatively to an 
announced restructuring measure.  We have found that the results are robust to lag structure, 
and we have reported the one year change measure.  The results in terms of restructuring 
announcements and performance are quite ubiquitous; firms in Japan for the period under 
analysis seem to deliver on restructuring announcements.  We can see this in stylized fashion 
in Table 2, where announcement types and changes in industry adjusted ROA are presented.  
Contractions, employment changes, internal reorganizations and financial restructuring type 
announcements are positively related with improvements in ROA.  Category ‘ALL’ here is a 
simple  dummy  variable  representing  whether  firms  made  any  of  the  six  categories  of 
announcements.  The significance of this variable for industry adjusted mean and median 
ROA  is  not  as  large,  since  it  includes  the  impact  of  expansion  and  internal  control  type 
restructuring announcements as well.  Apparently expansion activities and internal control 
changes  during  this  period  were  not  positively  correlated  with  higher  industry  adjusted 
performance.     
With 90 firms out of the random sample of 300 firms making over 800 restructuring 
announcements, it is obvious that firms are announcing and undertaking multiple restructuring 
actions.    In  Table  3  we  present  the  correlation  coefficients  between  the  six  major 
announcement types.  Perhaps not surprisingly, categories which are individually positively 
correlated with improvements in ROA tend to be positively and significantly correlated with 
each  other.    Categories  which  appear  to  be  uncorrelated  with  improvements  in  ROA 
(categories  Expansion  and  Internal  Control  Changes)  tend  to  be  negatively  correlated  or 
uncorrelated to all other restructuring announcements with the exception of expansions, which 
are positively correlated to internal reorganizations.  Overall, announcements of the type that 
are found to be positively correlated with performance improvements are correlated with each 
other.  Managers seem to try several types of actions in an effort to improve firm performance. Page 13 
 
In Table 4 we present our findings with respect to a specification of model (2).  We 
model changes in ROA as a function of the six categories of announcement type, the seven 
industry/ticker categories, and percent of foreign ownership.  Foreign ownership is included 
under the assumption that firms with greater foreign ownership are more likely to introduce 
performance enhancing measures.   
We have estimated (2) using both one and two period changes in ROA for robustness, 
although we only discuss and tabulate the one-period change in ROA to conserve space.  As 
in  the  univariate  correlations,  employment  reductions  and  cost  reducing  internal 
organizational changes contribute to improvement in both one and two-period changes in 
ROA.  Category 1 contraction-type actions and category 6 financial restructuring do not have 
a statistically significant impact on changes in ROA in the multivariate analysis.  A possible 
explanation  for  this  comes  from  the  results  in  Table  3:  there  is  a  significant  degree  of 
correlation between these two announcement types.  This collinearity will bias against finding 
a statistically significant impact of announcements on improvements in ROA.  Our attempts 
to deal with this issue do not conflict with the results of Table 4, except to enhance the impact 
of category 2 announcements, employment changes. 
The inclusion of foreign ownership in Table 4 was an indirect way of dealing with an 
inherent issue of endogeneity.  That is, our results are for firms that have made restructuring 
announcements,  meaning  that  they  are  conditional  on  the  decision  to  make  such 
announcements.  While this is precisely the issue we are concerned with, whether the decision 
to make such an announcement positively affects performance, we must attempt to deal with 
this potential endogeneity issue as a robustness check.  Failure to do so may simply reflect 
that  announcing  firms  are  simply  better  firms,  and  better  firms  are  more  likely  to  make 
restructuring  announcements.    To  address  this  issue,  we  use  a  2SLS  approach  with  the 
decision to announce is modeled as a function of observable variables, then using fitted values Page 14 
 
from the first stage as explanatory variables in the regression on performance.  Specifically, 
the 2SLS model we employ is: 
i t i i ROA c FOREIGN b a C , 1 . . ˆ
                 (3) 
IND f C e d ROA . ˆ .                   (4)   
In (3), the first stage of the 2SLS model, we model the decision to announce, Ĉ, as a 
function of the percentage of foreign ownership and pre-announcement change in ROA.  The 
logic here is that the percentage of foreign ownership is an observable (to the econometrician) 
proxy  for  outsider  pressure  (pro-shareholder),  and  pre-announcement  change  in  ROA 
represents both market and insider pressures for enhanced performance.  In the second stage, 
the fitted values for the announcement decision from (3) are used as the primary explanatory 
variable  for  changes  in  ROA  subsequent  to  the  announcement,  with  industry  or  ticker 
categories used as control variables.  This model allows us to avoid the endogeneity issue that 
announcing  firms  may  simply  be  ‘better  firms’  by  conditioning  on  governance  and  past 
performance.  While the endogeneity issue could also be dealt with via a ‘Heckman’ type 
correction, econometricians (e.g., Johnston and DiNardo, 1997) have largely abandoned this 
approach due to sensitivity of results with respect to specification which bias toward favoring 
the null hypothesis.  The results of the first and second stage regressions represented in (3) 
and (4) are presented in Table 5. 
The results of the 2SLS analysis are consistent with the unconditional results presented 
earlier.    From  the  second  stage,  improvements  in  ROA  are  enhanced  by  announcement 
decisions.    From  the  first  stage,  the  decision  to  announce  is  positively  related  to  the 
observable governance variable (percentage of foreign ownership) and inversely related to 
past performance (ROA in the fiscal year prior to the restructuring announcement).  These Page 15 
 
results support our earlier conclusions that restructuring announcements are indeed positively 
related to improvement in corporate performance. 
V.    Restructuring Announcements and Returns 
As discussed at  the outset  of this  paper, we are also  interested in  the question of 
whether restructuring announcements by firms have a significant impact on returns.  The 
question is of interest in terms of international comparisons, but there are important market 
specific  reasons  for  examining  the  issue  in  the  Japanese  context.    Generally  speaking, 
restructuring announcements have small, short-term positive impact on returns in the context 
of the  U.S.  market.   There are exceptions,  and some announcements  tend to  give mixed 
signals, such as layoff announcements (see Chen, et al, 2001).  The general finding of small 
positive impact on returns gives rise to the question of whether firms might consider making 
restructuring announcements that are pure window dressing, simply for the sake of boosting 
short-term returns. 
This question is particularly interesting in the Japanese context, and is an issue often 
raised  by  market  participants.    That  is,  given  the  lengthy  period  of  poor  economic 
performance, and poor performance by most firms in Japan specifically, might firms in that 
context consider making restructuring announcements in order to help boost returns, having 
observed  the  U.S.    experience?    While  the  Japanese  context  is  not  so  simple,  in  that 
restructuring announcements were initially avoided by firms for a very long period after the 
market and economic collapse began in late 1989, it is certainly plausible that managers in 
Japan might be tempted to follow such a course.  Such policies may not have the desired 
effect, however, for two reasons.  First, shareholders may be skeptical about the sincerity of 
the measures,  or they  might  believe that they will not  be the beneficiaries.   That  is, the Page 16 
 
restructuring process will stop at a stage that benefits only the fixed claimants, essentially 
shutting the residual claimants out. Such a finding would be consistent with the creditor-
centric corporate governance view of Japan (Morck and Nakamura, 1999). 
In this paper, we have already addressed the issue of substance: for our sample and 
period  of  analysis,  restructuring  announcements  as  a  whole  do  boost  firm  performance.  
Furthermore, specific types of restructuring announcements, especially those related to cost 
control, do positively affect firm performance as measured by improvements in ROA in a 
statistically significant fashion.  For our purposes here, therefore, the only question which 
remains  is  whether  in  fact  our  skeptical  market  participants  are  willing  to  pay  for  such 
announcements.    Specifically,  do  restructuring  announcements  in  Japan  for  the  period  of 
analysis boost returns in a statistically significant fashion?   
In Table 6 we consider the relation between the six major restructuring categories, as 
well as the overall announcement dummy variable, and three returns measures.  In this table, 
the interval [-1, +2] indicates returns measured from one day prior to an announcement to two 
days after the announcement, and so forth.  The results are generally not significant, with only 
expansion activity announcements (category 3) showing even modest positive impact at the 
usual levels of significance across all time periods.  On the basis of these univariate results, it 
does not appear that the market is generally prepared to reward firms for making restructuring 
announcements.  Indeed, if anything, market participants are more prepared to reward growth 
related announcements than typical restructuring announcements. 
We  must  consider  a  fully  controlled  model  for  returns  and  restructuring 
announcements  before  we  can  formally  conclude  that  the  market  is  unwilling  to  pay  for 
restructuring  announcements.    Our  basic  model  here  assumes  a  mapping  between 
restructuring announcements and returns.  The logic is just the extension of the relationship Page 17 
 
between  restructuring  announcements  and  performance  outlined  in  equations  (1)-(3).    If 
restructuring enhances performance, then we hypothesize that restructuring announcements 
should enhance returns.  The model to be tested is presented in equation (5), with the null 












.          (5) 
Results of estimating (5), using both market-adjusted returns (based on the TOPIX 
Index) and raw returns with the TOPIX Index return as an explanatory variable, are presented 
in Table 7.   None of the announcement categories appear to enhance returns.  Despite the 
previous evidence presented, that restructuring announcements do indeed appear to enhance 
performance, we cannot generally reject the null hypothesis that such announcements do not 
positively impact returns.  While we present only the 2-day announcement return regressions 
in  Table  7,  the  results  were  robust  with  respect  to  other  returns  windows.    The  relation 
between expansion measures and returns disappears in the multivariate analysis, suggesting a 
spurious correlation.  Unlike their counterparts elsewhere, market participants in the Japanese 
market are not typically willing to ante up for restructuring announcements, despite evidence 
that such activities positively affect firm performance.  Despite meaningful reforms in terms 
of accounting practices and transparency, market participants in the immediate post-reform 
and  post-tech  bubble  period  appear to  be  skeptical  about  restructuring  announcements  by 
Japanese firms. 
We  can  think  of  a  number  of  reasons  why  short-term  returns  in  an  event  study 
framework may fail to respond to restructuring announcements. Turning the issue on its head, 
one may argue that short-term returns in the event framework typically do respond in the US Page 18 
 
context because credibility and an active takeover mechanism in that context generally leads 
management to make good on such announcements.  As outlined in the introduction, the role 
of  insiders  and  the  sluggish  pace  of  restructuring  in  the  1990’s,  combined  with  poor 
prudential  policy  could  have  conditioned  agents  (outsiders)  to  be  skeptical  of  such 
announcements.  If this leads agents to adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude, the response in returns 
in a short-term event framework might be negligible, whereas longer window cumulative 
returns might improve as measures are actually implemented and performance improves. 
Naturally,  given  our  findings  that  some  restructuring  measures  do  indeed  enhance 
performance, we need to examine whether longer-window returns improve.  In Table 8 we 
present the univariate correlations between restructuring announcements and CAR’s measured 
at the 12 month, 24 month and 36 month windows.  Given the Bank of Japan’s zero interest 
rate or near zero interest  rate policy that prevailed during this  period,  we are not  overly 
concerned with issues of discounting, so the CAR measures used are raw undiscounted data.  
As can be seen, the shorter window is not consistent with improved returns in response to the 
restructuring announcements.  This is hardly surprising, if the environment is indeed one of 
‘wait and see,’ since improvements in performance take time to gel.  We believe 24 months is 
a reasonable period for all of the implementation and performance delays to work through, 
and this is consistent with our performance findings.  Longer windows, such as 36 months, 
are generally consistent with the 24 month window. 
In  broad  brush,  the  24  and  36  month  CAR  results  are  consistent  with  those  for 
performance:  restructuring  announcements  are  positively  correlated  with  improvement  in 
performance and improvement in CAR’s.  By contrast, performance improves in response to 
contraction  announcements  and  changes  in  employment  policy  as  well  as  internal 
reorganization  announcements  in  the  simple  correlations,  and  in  response  to  employment Page 19 
 
changes and internal reorganization in the OLS framework, but 24 month CAR’s respond to 
employment changes, internal control changes and financial restructuring.   
We repeated the CAR analysis in a multivariate framework.  However the coefficients 
on restructuring announcements were not statistically significant, and are not reported here.  
We  believe  the  insignificant  results  are  due  to  significant  collinearity  among  the 
announcement variables.  We were not successful in rectifying the problem using standard 
corrections for multicollinearity.  Overall, we are not confident that the univariate results for 
CAR’s and announcements are robust, and that evidence linking restructuring and returns 
appears weak. 
VII.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  considered  restructuring  announcements  in  the  Japanese  business 
press for 300 randomly selected firms from the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  
We found that 90 firms from that sample made over 800 restructuring announcements.  We 
grouped these announcements into six major categories, namely contraction events, employment 
changes,  expansion  actions,  internal  reorganizations,  internal  control  changes  and  financial 
restructurings.  We first considered the issue of whether firms that made such announcements 
had improvements in performance as measured by ROA.  We found that restructuring plans 
involving cutting back production or employment, internal reorganization (often with similar 
motives),  and  financial  restructurings  were  associated  with  positive  and  significant 
improvements in ROA.  This finding was robust to lag structure. 
We also considered the relationship between restructuring announcements and returns.  
We found no evidence for a positive relationship between announcements of restructuring 
activities and returns.  This finding was in stark contrast to the results found for restructuring Page 20 
 
and  performance.    Despite  significant  improvements  in  governance  and  accounting 
regulations  after  2000,  it  appears  that  market  participants  remain  skeptical  of  firm-level 
efforts to generate meaningful reforms.   Page 21 
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1.  Contraction Actions:  236 
Asset sales (sales of subsidiary shares/operation units/real estate) - Divestitures  60 
Spinoff unit - Divestitures  16 
Cut/postpone capital expenditures (infrastructure/equipment investments)  5 
Withdraw from line of production/business operation  29 
Cut production/production capacity (mostly domestic)  25 
Suspend production operations (mostly domestic)  6 
Consolidate subsidiaries/production plants/operation units/offices/branches   64 
Close domestic production plants/operation units/offices/branches  22 
Close oversea production plants/operation units/offices/branches  9 
2.  Employment Changes:  123 
Domestic layoffs  20 
Oversea layoffs  13 
Temporary layoffs (mostly domestic)  8 
Employee transfer / secondment (to different subsidiaries/plants/operation units)  33 
Reduce director/executive salary/bonus  7 
Reduce manager salary/bonus  5 
Reduce employee salary/bonus  4 
Performance-based salary/bonus/pension for managers/employees  8 
Recruit for voluntary early retirement / offer early retirement incentives  25 
3.  Expansion Actions:  250 
Increase domestic production   4 
Increase overseas production   47 
Expand distribution channels  10 
Setup new plants/operation units/distribution channels or start new line of production/business operation  40 
Establish subsidiary  13 
Increase capital expenditures   30 
Joint venture or strategic alliance / business and capital tie-up  70 
M&A (Merger via increased cross holdings and acquisitions  29 
Partial acquisition (acquisition of units/divisions)  7 
4.  Internal Reorganization Actions:  173 
Cut production/operating costs  75 
Modernize/improve production techniques/equipments/facilities  8 
Lower inventory  8 
Shift/change product line  6 
Reorganize existing production process/operation units  42 
Improve product distribution efficiency  22 
Outsource part of production/operation  9 
Change pricing policy (increase product price)  3 
5.  Changes in Internal Control:  26 
External directors/supervisors  6 
Appointed executives  5 
Turnover of CEO (resignation, reduction in number of CEO, new appointment)  6 
Improve governance (more frequent management meetings, setup of supervisory board, increase accounting transparency)  9 
6.  Financial Restructurings:  28 
Reduce/terminate cross holdings  4 
Main banks grant write-offs of company loans  3 
Bond issue  3 
Write off of non-performing assets (loans to subsidiaries)  2 
Receive financial support from main banks  1 
Report special loss arising from restructuring costs   15 
Table 1 
Restructuring announcements made by a random sample of 300 firms listed on the first tier of the Tokyo Stock  
Exchange in 2000-2001.   A total of 90 firms made 836 announcements over this time period.   Table 2 
 
Industry adjusted mean and median one period change in Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
ROA is calculated as Earnings Before Interest and Taxes divided by Total Assets.  Change in 
ROA is calculated as the difference between ROA at the end of the first fiscal year following the 
restructuring  announcement  and  the  ROA  at  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year  preceding  the 
announcement.  Industry adjusted ROA is calculated as ROA for the firm less the median ROA 
for all firms belonging to the same two-digit industry code matched by fiscal year.  A total of 836 
restructuring  plans, classified into six  broad  categories,  were announced  by  90  firms  from  a 
randomly selected sample of 300 firms over the 2000-2001 period.  P-values are provided in 
parentheses. 
 
Restructuring Action  Mean  Median 
 































Pair-wise correlations for restructuring announcements 
 
Pair-wise correlation coefficients for restructuring announcements made by a random sample of 
300  firms  listed  on  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange  over  the  2000-2001  period.    A  total  of  836 
announcements of various types were made by 90 firms from the sample of 300 firms over this 
period.  The restructuring announcements are classified into six types.   C1 refers to Contraction 
type events.  C2 refers to employment changes.  C3 refers to expansion actions.  C4 refers to 
internal  reorganizations.    C5  refers  to  internal  control  changes.    C6  refers  to  financial 
restructurings.  P-values are provided in parentheses. 
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Restructuring announcements and changes in ROA: OLS regression estimates 
 
Regression  of  change  (one  and  two  period)  in  ROA  on  restructuring  announcements,  industry 
dummy variables and foreign ownership.  One (two) period ROA changes are measured as the ROA 
at the end of the first (second) fiscal year following the restructuring less the ROA from one fiscal 
year prior to the restructuring announcement.  C1 refers to Contraction type events.  C2 refers to 
employment changes.  C3 refers to expansion actions.  C4 refers to internal reorganizations.  C5 
















Constant  -0.009   (0.13)  0.0093   (0.15) 
C1  0.006   (0.16)  -0.0013   (0.85) 
C2  0.009   (0.07)  0.014   (0.03) 
C3  0.0007   (0.87)  -0.0013   (0.81) 
C4  0.015   (0.002)  0.015   (0.01) 
C5  -0.002   (0.73)  -0.013   (0.32) 
C6  0.002   (0.79)  -0.002   (0.78) 
% Foreign  0.037   (0.07)  0.0022   (0.95) 
Industry Dummies  YES     YES   
         







 Table 5 
 
Change in ROA following restructuring announcements:  
2-stage least squares regression estimates  
 
Panel A presents OLS estimates of the decision to announce a restructuring plan.  Fitted 
values of the decision to announce (C_hat) are used as explanatory variables in the second 
stage OLS regression of the change in ROA following the restructuring announcement.  A 
total of 836 restructuring plans were announced by 90 firms from a randomly selected 
sample of 300 firms over the 2000-2001 period. 
 
 
Panel A: First stage OLS estimates of the decision to announce as a function of foreign 
ownership and pre-announcement ROA measured at the end of the last full fiscal year 
preceding the restructuring announcement.  Foreign Ownership is fraction of equity held by 
non-Japanese institutions.  Individual ownership is domestic holdings by individuals (not 
cross-held).  P-values in parentheses. 
 








Pre-Restructuring ROA  -4.03748          (0.0001)   
Adj.  R-sq  0.3522     
F-statistic  87.63     
 
Panel B: Second stage OLS estimates: Post announcement change in ROA as a function of 
fitted value of the decision to announce (C_hat) and industry category.  ROA change is 
measured as the difference in the ROA at the end of the first (second) fiscal year following 
the restructuring and the ROA from one fiscal year prior to the restructuring announcement.  
P-values in parentheses. 
One Period Change in ROA  Two Period Change in ROA 
Constant  -0.0165  (0.0001)  -0.00555 (0.315) 
C_hat  0.03073  (0.0001)  0.0210  (0.0001) 
Industry Dummies  YES    YES 
Adj R-sq  0.1552    0.109 
F-statistic  11.98    8.33 
 
 Table 6 
 
Restructuring announcements and stock returns 
 
Announcement dates are based on reports in the Nihon Keizai Shinbum.  A total 
of 836 restructuring plans were announced by 90 firms from a randomly selected 
sample of 300 firms over the 2000-2001 period.  All returns are adjusted for 
market using the TOPIX Index.   P-values are provided in parentheses. 
 
Event type  Day [-1,2]  Day [-1,1]  Day [-1,0] 
 
Contractions  -0.0089  -0.0045  0.002 
  (0.4)  (0.56)  (0.71) 
Employment Changes  -0.046  -0.027  -0.011 
  (0.08)  (0.2)  (0.48) 
Expansions  0.019  0.017  0.015 
  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
Internal Reorganizations  -0.008  -0.007  0.004 
  (0.68)  (0.67)  (0.68) 
Internal Control Changes  0.019  0.012  0.01 
  (0.47)  (0.45)  (0.49) 
Financial Restructurings  0.0067  0.01  0.008 
  (0.59)  (0.24)  (0.36) 
ALL  -0.0067  -0.0019  0.003 
  (0.49)  (0.81)  (0.59) 
 Table 7  
Restructuring announcements and returns: OLS Regression Estimates 
Market-adjusted as well as raw returns are measured over three days centered on the restructuring 
announcement date.  Market-adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the return on the TOPIX 
Index.  %Foreign refers to equity ownership by foreign institutions.  Industry fixed Effects are based 
on two-digit industry classifications.  P-values are presented in parentheses. 
         
         
Dependent variable  Market-adjusted Return  Raw Return 
         
Constant  -0.016  (0.51)  -0.016  (0.53) 
         
TOPIX Return      0.87  (0.05) 
         
%Foreign  0.05  (0.44)  0.048  (0.47) 
         
Contraction-type Events  0.016  (0.24)  0.016  (0.25) 
         
Employment Changes  -0.018  (0.23)  -0.019  (0.22) 
         
Expansion Events  0.022  (0.15)  0.022  (0.15) 
         
Internal Reorganizations  0.0004  (0.77)  0.004  (0.77) 
         
Internal Control Changes  0.008  (0.73)  0.007  (0.76) 
         
Financial Restructurings  0.017  (0.52)  0.019  (0.49) 
         
Industry Fixed Effects  YES    YES   
         
Adj.  R-sq  -0.034    0.019   
         
F-stat  0.81    1.11   
 
  




Restructuring announcements and CAR’s 
 
Announcement dates are based on reports in the Nihon Keizai Shinbum.  A total 
of 836 restructuring plans were announced by 90 firms from a randomly selected 
sample of 300 firms over the 2000-2001 period.  CARs represent market-adjusted 
cumulative returns using the TOPIX Index.  Time in brackets is measured in 
months [from, to].   P-values are provided in parentheses. 
 
Event type  Period [0,12]  Period [0,24]  Period [0,36] 
 
Contractions  .109  0.324  0.408 
  (0.08)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Employment Changes  -0.046  0.301  0.232 
  (0.66)  (0.000)  (0.028) 
Expansions  -.026  0.175  0.247 
  (0.69)  (0.11)  (0.05) 
Internal Reorganizations  -0.160  -0.177  -0.167 
  (0.35)  (0.41)  (0.47) 
Internal Control Changes  0.126  0.314  0.394 
  (0.16)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Financial Restructurings  0.010  0.226  0.468 
  (0.97)  (0.000)  (0.13) 
ALL  .044  0.226  0.298 
  (0.35)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
 